The libertarian political movement included people who believe in a valuable strain of liberalism that is skeptical of power, especially government power. The libertarian movement also turned out to be without guardrails keeping out opponents of liberalism and the open society. Liberalism’s opponents, too, found homes in libertarianism, and debate about their role has attracted attention to the erstwhile movement.

Below, I review the attempts during my political lifetime to define the borders of libertarianism, including my own attempts. I follow it up with an illustration from a recent debate about libertarianism, classical liberalism, and democracy.

What follows isn’t a defence of or attack on libertarianism. Underlying principles matter much more than a political label, and I’m about to throw my support behind the claim that the word “libertarian” has never described a single set of underlying principles. Are Tom Woods, Hans-Hermann Hoppe, and Peter Thiel really libertarians? At this point, who cares? The important thing is they're not on my side.

The word “libertarianism” fits most easily as a sociological description of political alliances, especially a libertarian coalition nested within the broader fusionist coalition1 of the late 20th and early 21st century. Intellectual traditions, liberal and otherwise, informed the thought of individuals and groups within the libertarian coalition. These traditions were merely precursors to libertarian political ideas, not unifying strains of thought, or the foundations of firm borders that might purify the label of its pluralism.

The debate about who counts as a libertarian is pretty old.

The earliest manifestation of the debate over “who counts?” as a libertarian that I remember was pursued mainly by libertarians like those associated with the paleolibertarian Ludwig von Mises Institute. They hoped to exclude libertarian cosmopolitanism, especially “beltway” libertarians who made consequentialist arguments for free markets and small government. The argument went:

  • If what you care about is the consequences of actions rather than the principles that govern them,

  • then you would abandon the liberty principle (or the non-aggression principle) if the circumstances were right.

  • If you would abandon the liberty principle under any circumstances,

  • then you are No True Libertarian.

This is deeply silly, since it would exclude influential libertarian thinkers like the Mises Institute’s namesake and F. A. Hayek whose, work forms the foundation for influential strains of libertarian thought, scholarship, and activism.

During the period in which paleolibertarians were trying to write social liberals and consequentialists out of libertarianism, I don’t remember an argument that libertarianism and classical liberalism were the same thing. The impression I was given by the training through the libertarian talent pipeline in this period was that classical liberalism was the name for libertarian-ish people who couldn’t really commit to hardcore libertarian positions.2

This early version of No True Libertarianism ran from my earliest involvement with libertarianism in the early-mid-aughts until about a decade ago when the emerging nationalist and illiberal posture of the political right became impossible to ignore. In the 2010s, illiberal elements across libertarianism also became impossible to ignore. It was during this decade that more libertarians had self-consciously committed themselves to liberalism, or at least to the label.3

In response, more liberal/cosmopolitan libertarians who had been the targets of earlier attempts at elimination through purity tests began to administer their own. Their argument was:

  • Libertarianism is a radical commitment to liberty and so to liberalism, dynamism, and cosmopolitanism;

  • paleos and alt-right sympathisers are illiberal;

  • therefore, paleos and alt-right sympathisers are not libertarians.

I see the appeal. If this were how it worked, it would mean that I never had anything in common with people fighting for the ideas of the new right, which have gained power around the world and to which I’m deeply opposed. I also believe that a combined commitment to liberty and to the equal value and dignity of individuals is what most effectively constrains cruelty and coercion—the things that I cared about as a libertarian. It would be convenient in some ways if libertarianism logically required my values.4

But I don’t think this is how the label ever really worked, and that attempts to make it work that way have failed. If “libertarian” really just means a deep commitment to liberalism, then we have to start twisting ourselves into pretzels to try to explain why people who were clearly not liberals must really have been liberals in the way that mattered since they were libertarians. Or we have to explain why people who were obviously libertarians can’t have been, since they weren’t committed to liberalism. Murray Rothbard was no liberal, and he was known within libertarianism as “Mr. Libertarian”.

My good pal Peter Jaworski offered a different definition of libertarianism as this stage in the debate was emerging. I still think his is a dramatic improvement. His argument went (and, I think, still goes) like this:

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If I might take the beginnings of a stab at a definition: [we should] distinguish political morality from public policy. Libertarianism, in the broadest sense, is a public policy that endorses the libertarian set of political institutions for *any* reason. (What, precisely, constitutes that set I'm not yet sure about. It will be a range from no institutions; to military, courts, police; to those plus some social insurance/safety net.) 

Specifying bleeding heart indicates your moral commitments. You're a bleeding heart libertarian if your moral view is social justice, while your empirical beliefs push you in the direction of the libertarian set of political institutions. This is why there are such people as social conservative libertarians, utilitarian libertarians, contractarian libertarians, and so on. They are not incoherent, because one addresses normative commitments, while the other is a result of empirical commitments. 

People need to bridge the ought-state gap (TM).5 There is a gap, filled in by empirical facts, between what we owe to each other (if it's a positive, rather than negative, obligation), or what our moral duties are, and the institutions that we believe will realize or discharge those obligations. Since obligations are multiply dischargeable, the claim that the state should be the institution to do it requires it to meet a pretty high evidentiary burden. 

Notice that you don't need to give a damn about liberty at all and still count as a libertarian. Notice you can be pro-Borg hive-mind and, with some empirical beliefs, come out endorsing libertarian institutions. That makes you a libertarian. Full stop. 

Libertarianism as a political morality is what [Stephan] Kinsella has in mind. You only count as a libertarian here if you're down with [the non-aggression principle] (or get to that without thinking it axiomatic or whatever). Nozick, Rand, Rothbard are like this. They bridge the ought-state gap (TM) by logical necessity. I don't need any empirical beliefs to get to libertarian institutions because these moral views guarantee/require these and no others. I'm not this kind of libertarian.

Peter Jaworski, in 2013 Facebook conversations.

If I recall correctly, people were really happy with this definition when it came out, and became less happy with it as more libertarians revealed themselves not to be committed to political liberalism or the kind of social progressivism that “bleeding heart” libertarians espoused.

People who agree with bleeding heart libertarians do not want to admit that Hans-Hermann Hoppe is a libertarian. But Jaworski’s framework allows us to see the nature of the difference between Hoppe’s libertarianism and bleeding heart libertarianism.

Hoppe wants a world where people organize into small, intimate-order, hierarchical, segregated communities that keep out undesirables (like queer folks and democrats) with the threat of violence. His empirical belief is that his vision of libertarian political institutions—in this case, no government or a government too small to interfere with people segregating the way they really ought to and otherwise would—will deliver that world. Cosmopolitan libertarians have different empirical beliefs. They believe that government intervention allowed power structures to calcify and prevent people from combining and cooperating in ways that they otherwise would. Both want a smaller government, which is sufficient to make them libertarians. But they disagree completely about why. That two groups who disagree about fundamentals can nonetheless work towards a shared political goal is a familiar concept for libertarians, who are great fans of pointing out “bootleggers and baptists” coalitions.

Jaworski’s definition formed the basis of my understanding of libertarianism for close to a decade despite its biggest problem: there’s no consensus about what constitutes libertarian political institutions. That problem is what Matt Zwolinski and John Tomasi describe in their book The Individualists, where they argue that the many strains of libertarianism were “all under the same tent, none in agreement about what the tent contains".

I’ve been thinking about all this again in large part because of a series of posts by Zwolinski exploring what has happened to libertarianism:

Zwolinski’s treatment of libertarianism is congenial to Jaworski’s, but it’s not the same. Zwolinski argues that libertarianism was more of a tribe than a philosophy: a group of people working towards shared policy ends in a specific political coalition.

For a while, in my head, I thought the solution to the problem of disagreement about policy goals was to think of libertarianism not as an endorsement of specific institutions, but of a political strategy: whatever the problem, reduce the size and scope of government in response. A conception of libertarianism as a strategy preserves the insight that Jaworski offered more than a decade ago: that libertarians don’t have to have the same reasons for pursuing a set of policies.

But the “policy direction” tweak doesn’t help that with the world now, where we have, for example, libertarians compromising to work with the Trump administration and libertarians who consider themselves anti-fascists against Trump. The point can’t simply be simply to shrink the government when the government has been cut in order to undermine its own constraints.

It’s tempting to say that this is just the end of the label’s usefulness, but I still think it’s useful as an adjective indicating policy concerns and inclinations. Libertarian populists, libertarian liberals, and libertarian conservatives are not nonsensical terms to anyone who’s not committed to the idea that libertarianism has some unifying set of beliefs behind it. The “libertarian” qualifier gives us some idea of the sorts of policy inclinations and presumptions we might expect from people with ideological commitments like populism, liberalism, or conservatism.

For myself, I prefer just “liberal” (a strain within “mere liberalism”) or “market liberal”, though I don’t chafe at “libertarian liberal”. That said, the best strategy might be to copy my good friend Sarah and say, “Why don’t I tell you what I believe, and if you think it helps, you can call me what you want to call that.”

Postscript: an illustration

Matt Zwolinski and Ilya Somin have recently debated (Entries: Matt’s first post; Ilya’s first response; Matt’s response to Ilya; Ilya’s rejoinder) the commitment of libertarianism and/or classical liberalism to democracy.

My read: Zwolinski gets it right, with one caveat.

Somin demonstrates that he is a classical liberal by taking for granted that democracy deserves support, but he errs in thinking that libertarianism must do the same. Somin’s assumption that libertarians must be classical liberals makes him assume (wrongly) that must libertarians support democracy. He also describes (rightly) libertarians’ lack of a special commitment to arguing for democracy.

Through his posts, Somin demonstrates ably that libertarianism can’t assume support for democracy. Libertarianism’s support for democracy is contingent on policy outcomes, not inherent to its political ideas. In contrast, the open access order of liberalism rests on a system of democratic governance.

I disagreement at points with both authors. Somin claims that tyranny of the majority is a problem unique to democracy. But minority oppression is much older than liberalism or democracy. Tyrannies of the majority are a problem that democracy alone cannot solve, as is the (currently more prevalent) problem of tyranny of the minority. Neither problem was created by or is isolated to democracy.

Inspired by F.A. Hayek’s claim that he preferred “a liberal dictator to a democratic government lacking liberalism”, Somin and Zwolinski grapple with the problem of de-Nazification in Germany after WWII by an imposed, non-liberal government. Zwolinski tries to square the circle of preferring allied occupation in immediately-post-Nazi Germany by saying that the government imposed on Germany was indirectly democratically accountable. I agree with Somin that this doesn’t work—a liberal democratic government is responsible to the people it governs, not some population elsewhere that knows best. We need to be able to call illiberalism what it is, even when we like the aim.

But Zwolinski gets something right that Somin gets wrong. Somin claims, “the problem can be dealt with by limiting democracy, rather than abjuring it completely.” But democracy, in the sense that liberals care about it was not even on the table in post-war Germany, for the reason Somin identifies: there weren’t enough liberals to ground the system in the country. You can’t have liberalism without liberals.

The problem, I think, lies in interpreting Hayek as discussing a choice between liberal democracy and liberal despotism, which is how I was taught the quote, but not how I read it anymore. If a polity has bought into and can support a liberal, open access, Hayekian “great society”, then liberal democracy is always the right choice for a liberal, no matter how benevolent a despot might be available. Nothing in Hayek’s quip goes against this, though it might have been what he meant.

But when a polity will only support despotism, liberals are left choosing between flavours of illiberalism, not bad despotism and worse liberalism. An illiberal government of committed liberals trying to make liberal government possible is the type of illiberal government a liberal should prefer to one that drapes illiberalism with the trappings of democracy. This is nothing like an argument that democracy should sometimes be overturned to get to liberalism. It just says mere impressions of liberal institutions can’t manifest the real thing.

One shouldn’t confuse the idea that there are better and worse forms of illiberalism with the idea that some forms of illiberalism are more desirable for liberals than really existing, imperfect liberalism because it is really, really hard to establish liberal government. There’s no guarantee that, having given it up, it can simply be reestablished.

In the end, many libertarians do not support democracy, and it’s for the reasons Somin gives. Indeed, some of the most robust arguments used against democracy by its opponents were first articulated by libertarians. We don’t have to tie ourselves into knots to make sense of this because nothing about libertarianism requires commitment to democracy.

But liberals, classical or otherwise, have to support democracy in order to support liberalism. Democracy is, as Mike Munger recently put it, liberalism’s political manifestation. That doesn’t mean the majority is always right—it can be, as Judith Shklar put it, a marriage of convenience. But it is necessary.

Classical liberals should argue for democracy because they have an important lens through which to make the argument, as Zwolinski demonstrates in his pieces, and as I’ve argued, too.

Once again, assuming that libertarianism has unifying shared principles (in this case that it supports democracy) confuses more than it clarifies.

Recs

The transcript of a lecture by Jacob Levy on the role of progress in politics, part of his Justice in Babylon project, has just been published in two parts, with audio of the full lecture included. Justice in Babylon completely changed my orientation towards politics by giving me a path to reckon with unavoidable injustice that isn’t just opting out of politics completely. But (as this lecture makes clear) many people feel the argument undermines their ability to participate in politics.

I found Justin Ling’s latest at Bug-Eyed and Shameless, which provides a lens that frames politics as institutionalists vs anti-institutionalists, helpful.

If you missed Guillaume Attia’s excellent essay on Shklar’s The Liberalism of Fear, now’s your chance to fix that.

Those looking for hope should read my pal Rainer’s piece looking back on the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Finally, I’m watching Zack Beauchamp’s new venture, Public Reason with interest. This piece on the lack of a party idea or ideology behind the new coalition on the left gets to why I think claims that the political realignment is nearly complete are premature.

Featured photo is by Joshua Hoehne on Unsplash.

Notes:

1  I expand on the fusionist coalition and the forces that held it together here.

2  Stephen Harper, before he was the prime minister of Canada, said that he was a classical liberal and not a libertarian because he wasn’t an atheist. I found this quaint.

3  The “Liberalism Unrelinquished” project launched in 2014, and the premise was that libertarianism was really just a hard commitment to liberalism, while American liberalism was a deficient commitment that didn’t care about economic freedom and freedom from the government. Or something. I think people signed it for a lot of reasons. I signed it, and I do not agree with Daniel Klein’s political commitments these days.

4  It kind of can’t, because of my commitment to pluralism. But like I said, I see the appeal.

5  The ought-state gap is from Jaworski’s dissertation, it’s the gap between the idea that because something ought to be done, the government is the best institution through which to accomplish that goal. For example: If we think that no one ought to lie to their friends, it does not follow that the government should be tasked with monitoring and punishing lying between friends. Things like effectiveness, proportionality, costs, and alternatives all matter. Likewise, if we think everyone ought to have healthcare, it doesn’t follow that the government should run the healthcare system. Arguments are needed to get from the ought to the prescription for a specific government program.